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“Nonsense. Nonsense,—because you are making assumptions 
instead of simply describing. If your head is haunted by 
explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the 
most important facts.... ” 
  
 
 
 
—  
 
 
 Wittgenstein, Zettel, §220
 
 
 
 
  
1. Introduction 
 
Page 464 
Professor Dennett has recently embarked on what he considers a 
“demystifying philosophical investigation”†1 with respect to the phenomena of 
consciousness. In essence the strategy he has employed is one of getting us to 
“trade in” our ordinary intuitions so as to soften us up for the first phases of a 
full-fledged “scientific” explanation of consciousness in terms of sub-personal 
systems and their ontogenetic origins. His hope is that, once we are freed from 
certain misleading metaphors about the mind we will be receptive to such an 
“explanation.” 
Page 464 
In concentrating on this first stage of his treatment of conscious phenomena 
I would like to offer a critique of Dennett’s project from a Wittgensteinian 
perspective. For Wittgenstein was also concerned to “demystify” consciousness 
but his approach differed remarkably from Dennett’s. And this is ironic because in 
challenging our “everyday” intuitions about consciousness the latter essentially 
regards himself as working within a Wittgensteinian framework. For example, he 
tells us that “My debt to Wittgenstein is large and long-standing”†2 and he 
confesses that “what I am doing [is] a kind of redoing of Wittgenstein’s attack on 
the ‘objects’ of conscious experience.”†3 
Page 464 
I wish here to challenge the idea that the “reductive character” of Dennett’s 
project is in any way Wittgensteinian in spirit. I want to suggest that at a crucial 
point in their philosophy their views diverge significantly. That is to say, although 
they are good travelling companions up to an 
  
Page Break 465 
important cross-roads, in the end, their incompatible concerns take them in 
different directions. Furthermore, by reviewing Dennett’s project of “explaining” 
consciousness, we might begin to see some good reasons for preferring 
Wittgenstein’s “road less travelled.” Thus, although Dennett’s account of 
consciousness is often given centre stage in what follows, my ultimate aim is to 
throw light on the nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophical psychology by using 
Dennett as a foil. This should help us to see precisely how the former’s approach 
differs importantly from those advanced by many of today’s philosophers and 
cognitive scientists. 
  
2. Stuff and Nonsense 
 
Page 465 
When it comes to characterising the reality of psychological phenomena 
many of today’s philosophers in the post-Cartesian analytic tradition see 
themselves as faced with a choice: either to advocate some form of dualism or 
some form of materialism. 
Page 465 
The dualists tend to divide into two main camps, those who support 
substance dualism and those who support property dualism. Substance dualists 
take minds to be logically distinct entities which are strongly independent of 
bodies. Standardly such dualists argue that minds must differ from physical 
substances because they “stand beneath” entirely different types of attributes or 
properties—i.e., mental attributes or properties. According to this picture other 
bodily organs are used as a model for “minds”—the main difference being that 
ordinary bodily organs, such as hearts and livers, are located spatially in the 
world while minds are not. Furthermore, if one thinks of the mind as some sort of 
non-physical entity or substance, then it is a natural next step to think of 
“beliefs,” “feelings,” “moods” and their kin as objects, processes or states that 
inhabit the mental domain. Nevertheless, one could separate these two ideas and 
allow that although non-reducible “mental” phenomena exist “minds,” conceived 
as separate entities, do not. Those who take such a stand generally support a 
kind of “property dualism.” Such a position is reasonably popular even today. 
Page 465 
Strangely enough, treating the “mind” as a home for “mental episodes” is not 
logically tied to dualism. That is to say this “picture” of the mind as an extra non-
bodily organ can get mixed up, in a most unhelpful way, with a crude 
materialism. This happens when one simply relocates the mind in the brain and 
treats mental phenomena as identical 
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types or token brain events. Such mind/brain events are then placed in a 
“physical” chain of causes. They are designated both as the end result of 
incoming brain process and as the starting point for outgoing brain processes. 
Appropriately, given the foundations of the modern debate, such a view has been 
dubbed “Cartesian Materialism.” 
Page 466 
Asserting mental/physical identity is, of course, the natural response or 
reaction to dualism in its various forms—but it is little more than that. This simple 
“re-fitting” makes these materialists prone to misrepresent the nature of 
psychological phenomena in a new, perhaps more insidious, way. The mental 
objects, states, processes, events, and so on, which, in accord with dualism, 
would have inhabited the mind, have now simply become allegedly 
“unmysterious” brain states, processes, activities, and events. Nevertheless, all 
their interesting mental properties are somehow supposed to survive the 
transition. 
Page 466 
What is interesting is that neither dualism nor materialism, as sketched 
above, tell us anything of much interest about the nature of mental phenomena. 
In fact the debate over their physicality can obscure many important questions 
about their character. One of the initial problems in getting clear about the nature 
of mental phenomena is that we find it hard to free ourselves of Cartesian-style 
thinking on these matters. For what thwarts both the materialist and the dualist 
when it comes to understanding the ontological commitments of commonsense 
psychology is that they “accept a certain vocabulary and with it a set of 
assumptions.”†4 The main assumption being that it is justified to debate the 
ontology of “mental” objects and processes without first saying what their nature 
is. 
Page 466 
Wittgenstein and Dennett are united in their rejection of such talk. For 
example, one of the primary stated aims of Consciousness Explained is to 
undermine the Cartesian legacy in the philosophy of mind. Dennett believes that 
most philosophers, and those lay folk influenced by them, conjure up images of 
an Inner (mental) Theatre complete with a Self who examines various Objects of 
Consciousness (pains, colours, figments of the imagination, etc.) whenever they 
think of the mind. They still think of our verbal reports concerning consciousness 
as based upon what the Self sees “up on the screen.” Apparently it “introspects” 
mental items in a way similar to that in which we ordinarily inspect everyday 
things such as watches or pieces of china. 
Page 466 
Dennett hopes to undermine this Cartesian model of the mind. To this end 
throughout the chapters of Consciousness Explained he catalogues 
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the kinds of traditional problems that such a view engenders. Such problems 
include the interaction problem,†5 the problem of inverted spectra,†6 and 
problems concerning epiphenomenal “qualia.”†7 However, he gives us an insight 
into his overarching reason for resisting the view by telling us that the 
“fundamentally anti-scientific stance of dualism is, to my mind, its most 
disqualifying feature.”†8  
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Page 467 
Wittgenstein is also particularly interested in the idea of the Inner (or “states 
of consciousness” as he refers to them in the preface of the Investigations). 
Nevertheless, for him, the source of our misunderstanding about the nature of 
the Inner is not traced back to Descartes’ doorstep—rather it is generated by a 
primitive view of the operation of psychological language. For him the desire to 
reify the “psychological” is bound up with the view that all language is essentially 
referential in nature. It is linked with the idea that the primary function of words 
is to provide names for objects. It is also bound up with the notion that the 
essential aim of language is to effect a simple form of communication. The idea 
that when I tell you what is “going on inside me” I use words like “sharp pain” to 
pass on information to you. If you are acquainted with “sharp pains” yourself, if 
you know what kind of things those words designate, then by analogy you gain 
an insight into my situation. For Wittgenstein, this picture of how language 
operates generates (and supports) the idea of an “inner realm of mental events” 
which looks non-trivially like the “mental realm” conjured up by Descartes’ 
philosophy of mind. 
Page 467 
It is the name-object view of language and its attendant metaphysics that 
Wittgenstein challenges with his celebrated “private language argument.” That 
argument is meant to show that the meaning of our sensation-terms cannot be 
based on any appeal to inner entities. Although it is much debated how to 
correctly interpret the Investigations’ passages from §243 to §275 which make up 
the “private language argument,” I am inclined to side with those who take 
Wittgenstein to be attacking the idea of the name-private-object view of 
psychological language on the grounds that it is both superfluous and incoherent. 
I believe his essential criticism is that an individual trying to employ such a 
language must presuppose that the “signs” they are using are meaningful before 
they engage in the naming ceremony of private ostension which is supposed to 
give them their meanings. The primary problem is that in order to group 
sensations under a type one must already have in hand some independent 
standard with which to identify and classify them. Thus, it isn’t possible to use the 
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“object” itself to provide such a standard. And, in the absence of such a standard 
there can be no talk of being mistaken about whether or not a “sign” hits its 
target and this is what robs the putative sensation “label” of any possible 
meaning. 
Page 468 
What is important, for the terms of our discussion, is that because he attacks 
the name-object view of language Wittgenstein is led to abandon the “picture” of 
inner mental processes. He feels that the name-object view of psychological 
language is not only ill-founded, it is what prevents us from seeing our 
psychological situation aright. As he writes: 
  
 
 
 
The main difficulty arises from our imagining the experience 
(pain for instance) as a thing for which of course we have a 
name and whose concept is therefore quite easy to grasp.†9
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ‘inner’ is a delusion. That is: the whole complex of ideas 
alluded to by this word is like a painted curtain drawn in front 
of the scene of the actual word use.†10
  
 
 
 
  
Page 468 
Wittgenstein wants us to get past this picture and to attend to our actual use 
of psychological “concepts.” That is to say, he wants us to notice how, when and 
in what circumstances we actually make psychological ascriptions to others or 
give expression to our own psychological situation. It is precisely this attitude 
which underwrites the following series of remarks which are typical of the later 
writings: 
  
 
  
 The expression “Who knows what is going on inside him!” The  
 
interpretation of outer events as the consequences of unknown 
ones, of merely surmised, inner ones. The interest that is 
focused on the inner, as if on the chemical structure, from 
which behaviour arises. 
 
 
 
 
 
For one needs only to ask, “What do I care about inner events, 
whatever they are?!”, to see that a different attitude is 
conceivable.—“But surely everyone will always be interested in 
his inner life!” Nonsense. Would I know that pain, etc., etc. was
something inner if I weren’t told so?†11
  
 
 
 
  
Page 468 
And in the remark which follows shortly after those above we can see the 
beginnings of his positive account about how we do, in fact, actually speak about 
the “inner” lives of others: 
  
 
 
 
If we’re asked “What’s going on inside him?” we say “Surely 
very little goes on inside him.” But what do we know about it?! 
We construct a picture of it [the inner] according to his 
behaviour, his utterances, his ability to think.†12
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Page 469 
We can see from this that Dennett and Wittgenstein are allied in their attack 
on the tendency to reify “conscious states” (where this acts as an umbrella term 
for any number of mental phenomena such as feeling pain, seeing colours, 
experiencing dizziness, etc.). Thus, even though they attack the idea of a reified 
mind from different directions and with different agendas, they both object to the 
tendency to objectify experiences. As they see it the first things we must do if we 
wish to avoid becoming bogged down in the kind of interminable metaphysical 
squabbles that sponsor the traditional dualism/materialism debate is to recognise 
that the term mind does not refer to a kind of entity at all and to realise that 
conscious states are not special kinds of “object”—not even strange sorts of 
object whose essi really is percepi. 
Page 469 
It may also appear, at first glance, that despite the difference in the origins 
of their worries concerning reified mental phenomena Dennett and Wittgenstein 
advance somewhat similar positive accounts. More specifically, we might say the 
“behaviourist” aspect of Dennett’s “personal” level understanding of 
consciousness has Wittgensteinian roots. For example, in one way or another, 
they both agree that concentration on outward behaviour and linguistic 
“expressions” provides a better way for us to understand the nature of 
consciousness. My ultimate aim in this paper is to reveal that this apparent 
similarity is, in fact, an illusion. In what follows I will describe in some detail the 
road Dennett takes before comparing it to that of Wittgenstein in section four. 
  
3. Dennett’s New State of Consciousness 
 
Page 469 
In place of the Cartesian Theatre metaphor Dennett proposes what he calls 
the Multiple Drafts model of consciousness. He claims that 
“heterophenomenology” will serve as the best means of neutrally analysing the 
conscious reports of ourselves and others. While engaged in 
heterophenomenology we effectively allow the subject to verbally “describe for us 
the nature of his or her conscious experiences.” In reality, however, we let the 
subject generate a text about a “notional” world and, on the whole, we give them 
authority concerning the nature of that world and what is found in it. Such 
notional worlds are analogous to fictional worlds, such as Sherlock Holmes’s 
London (not the real London).†13 In being of a like nature to such fictional worlds, 
“The subject’s heterophenomenological world will be a stable intersubjectively 
confirmable theoretical posit, 
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having the same metaphysical status as, say, Sherlock Holmes’s London or the 
world according to Garp.”†14 
Page 470 
The “texts” which are generated in these circumstances (and not something 
above and beyond which they refer to) effectively constitute consciousness. We 
need take the conscious experiences described in them no more seriously at the 
level of ontology than we would Professor Moriarty or the hound of the 
Baskervilles. To put it crudely, according to this view, conscious experience is 
treated as nothing over and above the very “reports” we give, “judgements” we 
make, and “beliefs” we hold about our putative experiences. Thus, consciousness 
is reduced to the “intentional” in this fashion. 
Page 470 
Nor is Dennett satisfied with this reduction alone. He feels that we cannot 
fully “explain” consciousness unless we get beneath it somehow. We won’t have 
explained it until we give a naturalistic explanation of our ability to make “speech 
acts” which purportedly act as expressions of our conscious experience. For, he 
believes that “Only a theory that explained conscious events in terms of 
unconscious events could explain consciousness at all.”†15 His hope is therefore to 
explain how it is that our “talk about consciousness” is produced by underlying 
sub-systems and to give an ontogenetic explanation of how those sub-systems 
were formed. That is to say, after having argued that the episodes of 
consciousness are nothing but the content of coherently generated 
heterophenomenological texts Dennett’s next move is to try to explain our ability 
to generate such texts from within a naturalistic framework. The essence of his 
explanatory account is described in this quotation; “I am suggesting conscious 
human minds are more-or-less serial virtual machines implemented—
inefficiently—on the parallel hardware evolution has provided for us.”†16 The 
virtual machine that gives rise to consciousness he calls a Joycean Machine. That 
is, one which is able to generate detailed texts concerning “streams of 
consciousness” after the fashion of James Joyce’s production of Ulysses. 
Page 470 
This view has an important consequence. That is to say, since Dennett does 
not believe the Joycean software (i.e., that which turns us into conscious beings) 
is built-in, he is prepared to argue that Joycean machines are the result of 
cultural design. Hence, we get the result that consciousness is “... largely a 
product of cultural evolution that gets imparted to brains in early training.... ”†17 
At one point he even makes this intrepid remark: “If consciousness is something 
over and above the Joycean machine, I have not yet provided a theory of 
consciousness at all.”†18 
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Page 471 
This aspect of Dennett’s account has been a major source of disillusionment 
for his readers—for as they see it such an admission amounts to a complete 
rejection of the idea that conscious states have any “qualitative” content—a 
denial that there is anything that it is “like” to experience certain forms of 
consciousness. Their complaint is usually made by pointing to the fact that non-
human animals and infants surely have conscious awareness even though they 
lack the ability to produce texts of a Joycean standard.†19 
Page 471 
The way Dennett jumps in response to this sort of criticism is instructive. In 
places he seems to concede the possibility that consciousness might obtain even 
without a full-fledged Joycean text based on our linguistically mediated capacity 
for “reportage.” That is to say he allows that “Heterophenomenology without a 
text is not impossible, just difficult.”†20 For example, he says of imagining what it 
is like to be a bat, the “task would require us to subject ourselves to vast 
transformations... [but] we could use our research to say what these 
transformations would be.”†21 In this case our biological and ecological research 
would help by showing “us a great deal of what a bat could and could not be 
conscious of under various conditions.”†22 That is, through empirical and 
controlled testing ecologists may be able to tell me that bats can only be aware of 
moths (or what not) at X distance. And, naturally, such information will be of help 
to me in the course of devising a “notional world” for the bat. 
Page 471 
At other times he responds by arguing that our “folksy” intuitions regarding 
animal and infant consciousness are not sacrosanct.†23 Thus, when Fellows and 
O’Hear point out that: “an immediate reaction to the virtual software aspect of 
the multiple drafts model might be to say animals and human infants seem to be 
conscious perfectly well without the mediation of any culturally acquired 
‘software’...,”†24 Dennett has the ready reply: “I agree; they seem to be. But are 
they? And what does it mean to say that they are or they aren’t?... I claim that 
this question has no clear pre-theoretical meaning.”†25 This is the crux of the 
matter: Dennett doesn’t feel we can make any “pre-theoretical” sense of our 
shared intuitions about the general quality of conscious experience (non-verbal or 
otherwise).  
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Page 471 
The common thread to both responses is that we must not surrender, at any 
cost, the streamlined and principled criterion for consciousness which is provided 
by heterophenomenology. For a return to our rag-tag intuitions on this score 
could potentially lead to the admission of all kinds 
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of nonsense and a re-vitalisation of the perplexing paradoxes of consciousness. 
But the price we must pay for having this “neat” criterion is that we must jettison 
some of our most deeply held intuitions concerning consciousness. 
Page 472 
One might expect that in doing away with the very idea of “objects” of 
consciousness Wittgenstein must be advancing a revisionist line as well. But 
importantly he does not. On the contrary he is concerned to “leave everything as 
it is.” In the next section I want to explain how he does this and to show how this 
makes his views on the philosophy of psychology more plausible than Dennett’s. 
  
4. Expressing Wittgenstein’s Position 
 
Page 472 
I have claimed that Wittgenstein offers an understanding of consciousness 
that differs significantly from that of his self-styled “follower” Dennett. I maintain 
that the key difference between these two thinkers revolves around their 
attitudes towards the behaviour and speech acts which are regarded as 
deliverances concerning “consciousness.” Wittgenstein is concerned to understand 
those deliverances as expressive in character while Dennett, on the other hand, 
hardly gives them any attention at all in his eagerness to engage in his larger 
project of “explaining” consciousness. 
Page 472 
I said at the outset that I wanted to use Dennett’s account to help throw light 
on Wittgenstein’s position—to show in what ways the latter’s position was 
superior. I hope to achieve this by revealing the naïveté inherent in Dennett’s 
attitude toward the nature of psychological language. It is his lack of attention to 
the issue of how we interpret speech acts that makes his treatment of 
consciousness thoroughly inadequate. It is because he lacks any positive account 
of how such language operates that, unlike Wittgenstein, he has trouble making 
room for the “inner” after having evacuated the Cartesian Theatre. Let me make 
my complaint more specific. 
Page 472 
Despite having partially seen that it is a serviceable objection to Cartesianism 
to show that there are no mental items which are “designated” by our talk of 
conscious experience, his very description of the heterophenomenological method 
nevertheless encourages the view that language, when it is performing its true 
office, is essentially referential in 
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character. That is to say, he feels no discomfort in treating the deliverances 
concerning consciousness as referring to objects in the subject’s notional world. 
The idea, as I understand it, looks something like this: we can make space for 
conscious entities so long as we don’t take them too seriously at the level of 
ontology. This is why his account of consciousness is truly deflationary. Dennett’s 
“irrealism” about consciousness is non-accidentally linked with the fact that he 
still treats talk of conscious experiences as “kinds of report” whereas Wittgenstein 
does not. My objection to Dennett is that one will only feel the pressure to treat 
conscious deliverances less than seriously if one thinks that the purpose of 
language is simply to “name”—hence having failed to name a “real” thing we 
should think of this talk as naming “notional” things. 
Page 473 
What is worse, despite his appeal to “notional worlds,” Dennett still owes his 
reader an account of how we are able to interpret the content of “reports” that 
others make and the content of the beliefs they hold. And even he realises that 
the heterophenomenological “process depends on assumptions about which 
language is being spoken, and some of the speaker’s intentions.”†26 But he gives 
no explanation as to how we are able to interpret these quasi-‘reports’ of others. 
For example, in collaborating to create your heterophenomenological world I hear 
you say “I see a purple cow.” But what is it that I take you to be saying? How am 
I to understand the meaning of that report if it is referring to some item in your 
notional world? What is it about my knowledge of English that enables me to 
know what you mean? It cannot be that I understand you because I know what 
kind of notional objects your words designate. For, to put the point succinctly, the 
private-language argument will work just as effectively against objects in a 
notional world as in a private inner world. Beetles in boxes are beetles in boxes, 
whether they are real or notional. 
Page 473 
Having seen the folly of thinking that you are referring to a private object of 
experience when making an utterance about your state of mind, Dennett does not 
go on to provide any plausible positive account as to how we might make sense 
of such utterances even though “typically, he has subjects being conscious only of 
the content of their mental states.”†27 But if this is the case why doesn’t Dennett 
give more attention to the content of the “seeming” reports about conscious 
seemings? He doesn’t even begin seriously to address such questions other than 
to appeal to the fact that for most conscious beings who speak the same 
language it will 
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be unproblematic to determine what they mean. I believe he is faced with this 
problem because, despite his reduction of consciousness to the intentional, 
Dennett is also deeply suspicious of “meaning” and follows a Quinean eliminativist 
line in treating “meaning” as non-objective and hence of second-rate importance. 
Page 474 
I believe that it is Dennett’s complete lack of concern for the workings of 
psychological language that crucially divorces his project from its Wittgensteinian 
origins. Furthermore, it is because he rejects the idea of the “reified mind” for 
very different reasons than Wittgenstein that he feels no pressure to address 
these sorts of issues. 
Page 474 
Ironically, because he does not fully appreciate Wittgenstein’s purposes 
Dennett accuses him of lacking the courage of his conviction in this matter. For 
instance, while he approves of the famous remark: “The thing in the box has no 
place in the language-game at all; not even as a something; for the box might 
even be empty”—he accuses Wittgenstein of “Hedging his bets” when he adds 
shortly afterward “Its not a something, but not a nothing either.”†28 Dennett, on 
the other hand, tells us that he is willing to take the bull by the horns and claims 
in doing so to be more “radical” than Wittgenstein.†29 But this sort of talk only 
reveals how little Dennett really understood Wittgenstein’s positive views. 
Page 474 
It is true that many have found the “not a something but not a nothing” 
remark to be deliberately and unnecessarily cyptic. But I think Wittgenstein is 
simply being careful. What he is doing is partly re-stating his dismissal of the 
“reified mind”—i.e., repeating that he is not prepared to treat consciousness as 
“thing-like”—while at the same time making it clear that he nevertheless remains 
committed to taking our talk of consciousness seriously. We are not reporting to 
others about objects in a real ‘inner’ world nor non-objects in some notional 
world. What we are doing is giving expression to our psychological situation. 
Unlike Dennett, at least Wittgenstein tells us a story about how psychological 
language operates. 
Page 474 
Wittgenstein is like Dennett in that he realises that once we give up on the 
myth of a “reified mind” we cannot construe judgements about our psychological 
situation as being kinds of report. We cannot treat them as being based on some 
kind of inner evidence because the very idea of inner evidence is an oxymoron. 
That is to say, we are not making judgements about “inner objects” when we give 
expression to our “inner” situation. And this also means we have no evidence to 
back up statements about our 
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inner life. And just as the idea of “inner” evidence is nonsense it would be equally 
wrong to think that we rely on “outer” evidence in order to decide how we feel. I 
do not decide that I am in pain by first noticing a cut on my leg, nor do I decide 
this by noticing that I am having an “inner” sensation of pain by some process of 
introspection. I simply feel pain and say so. Psychological language is expressive, 
not referential. This is why “a lie about inner processes is of a different category 
from one about outer processes.”†30 
Page 475 
My linguistic utterances of pain are natural extensions of, or replacements 
for, my earlier ways of expressing pain—i.e., shouting, bawling, etc. A 
development of more primitive forms of response that we share with animals. It 
is because psychological language is expressive that Johnson tells us that the 
basis of our sophisticated kind of language game has more to do with sincerity 
than accuracy.†31 Accuracy presupposes some independent means of verification 
and that is precisely what we lack in this case. Hence, Wittgenstein encourages 
us to treat the speech acts concerning our “inner life” as confessional in nature. 
He writes; “What is the importance of someone making this or that confession? 
Does he have to be able to judge his condition correctly?—What matters here is 
not an inner condition he judges, but just his confession.”†32 And note “... 
confession is of course something exterior.”†33 
Page 475 
But we may wonder: how are we to understand “pretence” on a view that 
insists that ‘nothing is hidden’ and that psychological language is essentially 
expressive? For of course it is still possible that a person could be lying with their 
confession. And what are they lying about? Here Wittgenstein reminds us that: 
“Above all pretence has its own outward signs. How could we otherwise talk 
about pretence at all?”†34 Moreover he makes it perfectly clear how we are to 
treat such cases when he talks about the role trust plays in dealing with another’s 
psychology. He writes: “Do I pay any mind to his inner processes if I trust him? If 
I don’t trust him I say, “I don’t know what’s going on inside him.” But if I trust 
him, I don’t say I know what’s going on inside him.”†35 That is to say, if I do trust 
him I treat his utterances as being genuinely expressive—just as in a more 
primitive setting his facial or other bodily expressions would be transparent to 
me. If there is an asymmetry between these cases it is just the opposite of what 
one would expect if we thought there were objects of consciousness. In the case 
where there is pain we can get by with just the “expression,” in the case of 
pretence, where there is no pain, we must treat 
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the utterance as serving a different and potentially deceptive function. The point 
is that we need not return to the idea of a reified mind in order to make logical 
space for the possibility of “pretence.” 
Page 476 
Is this, in effect, a reduction of the inner to outer behaviour? Wittgenstein 
constantly rejects this interpretation of his project. This occurs in many places in 
the later writings. I have collected but a few to support my view that it is wrong 
to read him as sponsoring behaviourism in any form. 
  
 
 
 
... the impression that we wanted to deny something arises 
from our setting our faces against the picture of the ‘inner 
process’. What we deny is that the picture of the inner process 
gives us the correct idea of the use of [psychological] 
word[s].... †36
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at 
bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour 
is a fiction?”—If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a 
grammatical fiction.†37
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
... we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet 
uncomprehended medium. And now it looks as if we had denied
mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them.†38
 
 
 
 
 
  
But am I not really speaking only of the outer?... it is as if I 
wanted to explain (quasi-define) the inner through the outer. 
And yet it isn’t so.†39
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I believe it helps to see how unbehaviourist he really was when we contrast 
his position to that of Dennett’s. For in concentrating solely on the “grammar” of 
our mental discourse, by rejecting the name-object picture of language as 
altogether inappropriate in this domain, Wittgenstein is led to a more satisfactory 
view of the nature and importance of consciousness. He has not tried to equate 
“consciousness” with talk of the outer behaviour of bodies, rather he has 
reminded us that in treating others as conscious we are always engaged in an 
interpretative project (broadly conceived) informed by our form of life. 
Page 476 
The important thing to notice is that talk of “our experiences” is not to be 
treated as analogous to the language we use when talking about physical objects. 
Psychological talk has its own unique grammar that must be attended to if we are 
to understand it. In other words the strength of Wittgenstein’s approach is that 
when he rejects the idea that reified conscious states have reality rights he 
simultaneously attacks the name-object picture of language. Thus, as he has a 
different, more sophisticated conception of how language operates, he is not even 
tempted to be 
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“irrealist” about consciousness. He writes: “The connection of inner and outer is 
part of these concepts. We don’t draw this connection in order to magically 
remove the inner. There are inner concepts and outer concepts.”†40 Thus, 
although Wittgenstein is often regarded as the grand guru of “logical 
behaviourism” with respect to “the mental,” it is in fact more appropriate that 
Dennett should wear this title. For Witttgenstein the inner is not demystified 
through elimination. It is demystified because in attending to the nature of 
psychological language our understanding of “consciousness” is, to use Mulhall’s 
words, “de-mythologized.” 
  
5. Conclusion 
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What would Wittgenstein make of Dennett’s “demystifying investigation”? I 
think he would regard the latter’s counter-intuitive “theory” as a bad response to 
a series of problems which rest on a house of cards. In offering us such a 
“theory” Dennett is falling into the trap of trying to give “new information” or a 
“new discovery” to solve a philosophical problem†41 when instead what is needed 
is an investigation into the way psychological language operates.†42 Ironically, by 
advancing his “metaphysically minimalist” account of consciousness which 
introduces us to such things as “notional worlds” Dennett has simply generated a 
new sort of mythology of his own. Rather than settling the issue with his “new set 
of metaphors” he simply creates different puzzles to confuse the metaphysician. 
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Wittgenstein’s attitude, on the other hand, is that philosophy finds peace 
when it understands the nature of the problems that concern it (and bedevil it). 
Thus, in taking the road he does, in the end we must regard Dennett as being 
mistaken in believing that he is, in fact, “more Wittgensteinian than St. Ludwig 
himself.”†43 It is not that Dennett has been more thorough in his application of 
Wittgenstein’s principles, rather it is that he has thoroughly misunderstood those 
principles. We must correctly describe our psychology by attending to our 
ordinary psychological talk. We will not escape our philosophical problems by 
supplanting such talk (or surpassing it) by advancing a superior theory. This 
reveals the crucial difference in the character of their “demystifying” 
investigations. To successfully demystify consciousness Dennett thinks we need 
to develop a principled, and revisionist, theory of consciousness—but, if 
Wittgenstein is right what we require is a rearrangement of facts we have already 
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always known. We need to get a clear view of the nature of our psychological 
language. 
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